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INTERNAL GOODS TO LEGAL PRACTICE: RECLAIMING FULLER WITH 
MACINTYRE 
Mark Retter* 
 
Abstract:  Lon  Fuller  rejected  legal  positivism  because  he  believed  that  the  ‘procedural 
morality of law’ established a necessary connection between law and morals. Underpinning 
his argument is a claim that law is a purposive activity grounded by a relationship of political 
reciprocity  between  lawgivers  and  legal  subjects.  This  paper  argues  that  his  reliance  on 
political reciprocity implicates a necessary connection between his procedural morality and 
an unarticulated ‘substantive morality of law’: it presupposes that law is properly understood 
by reference to the political task of achieving a common good. To establish this necessary 
connection,  I  propose  we  look  to  Alasdair  MacIntyre.  Understanding  law  as  a  ‘social 
practice’, on MacIntyre’s terms, can provide the necessary socio-political context to explain 
why and how legal practice is conditioned by political reciprocity. If we apply MacIntyre’s 
distinction between the internal and external goods of a social practice, legal positivism can 
be understood as confusing law as a co-operative social practice with the instrumentalisation 
of that practice by legal officials. 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
Responding to Fuller’s claim that the principles of legality, encapsulated by the rule of law, 
constitute a procedural morality of law,1 Hart wrote: 
[…] if this is what the necessary connection of law and morality means, we may 
accept it. It is unfortunately compatible with very great iniquity.2 
In a recent book, Rundle describes how the term s of reference in this famous exchange 
between Hart and Fuller were shifted to whether rule by law is more efficacious for achieving 
good rather than evil ends. 3 Fuller’s  jurisprudential  enquiry  was  indeed  focused  on  the 
functioning of law as a purposive social activity. However, through his procedural morality, 
he was trying to reveal how that functioning is constrained by moral principles of legality 
which constitute what it means to have the rule of law as a system of governance. According 
to Fuller, law is a rule-governed social practice, and the rules of legality have a distinct moral 
value. In his view, the debate with Hart was distorted by an instrumentalism that reframed his 
claims about the distinct moral character of the rule of law into arguments about the moral 
status of the political ends pursued through law. Hart, on the other hand, believed Fuller was 
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failing  to  adequately  distinguish  between  law  as  a  purposive  activity,  and  the  separate 
question of whether the relevant purposes are necessarily moral.4 The art of the torturer, for 
example, could be said to be a purposive activity governed by principles for success; but 
those principles are not necessarily moral principles. 
Rundle  undertakes  to  ‘reclaim’  Fuller’s  jurisprudence  from  the  misunderstandings 
haunting his debate with Hart; I believe this to be a worthwhile project.5 However, this paper 
argues that we need to go beyond Fuller’s own thought if we are to successfully complete his 
claims against Hart. My argument is that Fuller’s procedural morality of law implicates a 
broader commitment to a political common good as the proper end of law. Underpinning his 
argument that the functioning of law is constrained by this procedural morality is a claim that 
legal practice is conditioned by the idea of political reciprocity between a lawgiver and legal 
subjects. I will show that this ‘political reciprocity’ makes his procedural morality dependent 
on a substantive morality of law which he does not adequately develop. The nature of that 
dependency is uncovered by appreciating the full implications of an internalised and practical 
viewpoint that captures legal practice as an activity conditioned by the need for the reasons 
for action of participants to serve as a justification to citizens in a political community. In 
Fuller’s  terms,  we  need  to  appreciate  how  the  purposive  social  activity  of  law  provides 
reasons for fidelity to law and principles of legality if we are to explain law as a recurring 
social phenomenon through history.6 
I propose that MacIntyre’s teleological conception of social practices and political 
community provide important resources for this task. The co-operative and purposive nature 
of legal activity in Fuller’s account is captured by appreciating law as a practice, in the sense 
defined by MacIntyre; an activity involving an extension of skills, virtues and standards of 
excellence to realise a political order aiming at the common good.7 Understanding law in this 
way  requires  us  to  distinguish  between  the  ‘internal  goods’  of  legal  practice,  which  can 
provide a common source of motivation for all participants; and ‘external goods’, which are 
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only contingently related to the co-operative ends of the practice. I will consider why this 
distinction  is  helpful  to  establish  Fuller’s  procedural  morality  of  law  as  a  necessary 
connection between law and morals contrary to Hart’s legal positivism. 
 
B.  FULLER’S RULE OF LAW AND POLITICAL RECIPROCITY 
We  need  to  first  distinguish  what  Fuller  means  by  procedural  legal  morality. 8 Fuller 
understands law as ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’.9 
That enterprise is a purposive activity conditioned by certain internal standards of success, 
which define what it means to perform that activity well. He tries to capture these internal 
standards  in  eight  principles  of  legality.  Rules  must  be  general  in  nature;  promulgated; 
prospective  in  application;  intelligible;  free  from  conflict  and  contradiction;  possible  to 
comply with; stable through time; and have congruity with official action.10 The instantiation 
of these eight precepts is what constitutes a system of governance as a legal system, and 
forms an ‘internal’ or ‘procedural’ morality to law. Legal systems never perfectly comply 
with  these  precepts  but  are  constituted  as  legal  systems  to  the  degree  they  approximate 
perfect compliance.11 
Hart  does  accept  Fuller’s  eight  desiderata  as  defining  features  of  the  rule  of 
recognition, and perhaps minimum criteria for the existence of a legal system. But he disputes 
their  necessary  moral  significance. 12  In  particular,  he  criticises  Fuller  for  failing  to 
differentiate between the purposiveness of an activity and its moral significance. 13 The fact 
that law is a purposive activity does not establish it as intrinsically moral; just as the art of 
making poison is not intrinsically moral, although it may involve skills and internal principles 
that order it towards achieving the poisoner’s purposes. These are skills and principles for the 
efficacy of a craft. 
This  is  a crucial objection if we think that  Fuller has  not  established the internal 
principles  of  legal  craftsmanship  as  distinctively  moral,  compared  to  other  crafts  like 
poisoning. Unfortunately, Fuller’s description of the procedural morality partly lends itself to 
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an interpretation that would underscore the importance of his principles of legality merely for 
the efficacy of social control.14 He says: 
The term ‘procedural’ is concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but 
with  the ways  in  which a system  of rules  for  governing human  conduct  must be 
constructed and administered if it is to be efficacious and at the same time remain 
what it purports to be.15 
Fuller was concerned to avoid the traditional debate between natural lawyers and positivists 
about the necessary moral status of the ends of law.16 In particular, he was wary of any claim 
about the existence of some ‘higher’ natural law, which supersedes contrary positive law. But 
he was also aware that a focus of jurisprudential enquiry on the ends of law could blur the 
distinction between political and legal practice. Instead, he was attempting to establish the 
moral  character  of  the  rule  of  law  in  a  way  that  would  distinguish  it  from  a  general 
consideration of the substantive content of law.17 He describes the rule of law as involving 
principles of good legal craftsmanship that define what it means to construct and administer 
law well. Not simply as a means for achieving various political ends, but as a particular end 
or value with moral significance.18 This explains why he was so concerned by instrumentalist 
understandings of the rule of law. They ignore fidelity to law as an end in itself, which 
justifies the continued existence of, and engagement in, the purposive activity of law.19 
Let  us  distinguish  more  clearly  between  this  procedural   morality  of  law  and  a 
substantive morality of law. As a form of political governance, law directs citizens to political 
ends and binds them to those ends. Through this binding operation, law potentially implicates 
two interrelated but distinguishable questions that arise from considering how legal subjects 
may be thought of as morally bound by law. First, there is a substantive morality concerning 
what ends a community should pursue through law. Second, the binding operation of law 
raises the moral question for lawmakers concerning how human persons should be bound to 
the ends of a political community. I stress human person because it is in considering how a 
human person should be treated, as a subject of moral importance or value, which provides 
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that question  with its  moral  importance.  It  is  this  second question which is  the focus  of 
Fuller’s procedural morality of law. He wants to identify the eight desiderata as principles of 
good legal craftsmanship that constitute the rule of law as a morally valuable response to this 
question of how human persons ought to be bound to communal ends. This leads to the 
following question. How does Fuller connect his eight desiderata to this moral question, to 
establish the distinctive moral value of the rule of law as an end in itself? 
There are two interdependent themes Fuller associates with the moral status of his 
eight desiderata. He saw their moral worth as connected firstly to the relationship of political 
reciprocity between lawgiver and legal subject.20 His point is  that legal officials are in an 
interdependent  and  co -operative  relationship  with  legal  subjects.  In  the first  place,  the 
authority to make and administer a system of governance must be justifiable to citizens if it is 
to form a sustainable political order. There is a mutual need to govern human conduct in a 
political  community  which  gives  rise  to  a  corresponding  need  for  some  system  of 
governance. Fuller associates this political context with the substantive morality of law 
because it ‘makes law possible’.21 But law is only adopted as a distinct form of governance 
when the principles of legality are accepted as conditioning what it means to govern well. In 
other words, the eight desiderata provide standards by which the co-operative relationships 
required for stable political governance is respected. Compliance with those principles of 
legality  is  sustained  by  the  promotion  of  fidelity  to  law,  which  is  a  reciprocal  moral 
disposition of both legal officials and subjects to act co-operatively to maintain the efficacy 
of law. Thus, Fuller’s principle of reciprocity is supposed to capture the fact that the efficacy 
of legal practice is sustained by a fidelity to law as a good co-operative means for achieving 
political ends. 
This brings us to the second theme. Fuller points out that, within the context of this 
political  reciprocity,  compliance  with  the  eight  desiderata  enables  the  law  to  achieve  its 
function, of subjecting human conduct to general rules, in a way that respects the responsible 
agency  of  legal  subjects.  By  satisfying  the  eight  desiderata,  legal  officials  craft  and 
administer the system of law in such a way that citizens are better able to consider what those 
laws require of them, and to take that into account in deliberating about what they should do 
in a given context, and in planning how they should live their lives. This provides a basis for 
saying that the rule of law embodies a moral value because it is intrinsically connected to an 
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appropriate  respect  for  responsible  human  agency,  given  that  human  beings  are  rational 
agents with powers of self-determination.22 In other words, the rule of law enables political 
governance to respect human freedom. Fuller links this respect for human agency with an 
enhancement of respect for human dignity. 
Now, it is true that a lot of conceptual detail is missing from Fuller’s explanation of 
the  moral  value  of  legality,  especially  in  relation  to  the  nature  of  human  agency  and 
freedom.23 Nevertheless, he provides a rough sketch of his procedural legal morality with 
these two themes of reciprocity and human agency. An important part of his strategy is to 
distinguish his procedural morality from claims concerning the morality of the substantive 
political ends of law. Despite these intentions, however, my argument is that his  procedural 
morality  does  implicate  a  particularly  important  inter -dependency  with  the  substantive 
morality of law which required more detailed consideration to support his arguments against 
Hart.24 
Fuller relies on his principle of political reciprocity to establish the respect for human 
agency as an end internal to the form of that distinct type of governance called law. The 
reciprocity between lawgiver and legal subject is critical to his argument that legal officials 
qua legal officials must display fidelity to the rule of law if their form of governance is to be 
called  ‘law’  and  not  ‘managerial  practice’  or  perhaps  ‘tyranny’.25 This  is  where  Fuller’s 
account presupposes a treatment of legal pathology, which accounts for the way in which a 
breakdown  in  political  reciprocity  will  lead  to  ‘bad’  legal  systems  or  a  failure  to  even 
instantiate  rule  by  law. 26 Without  a  persuasive  articulation  of  the  political  theory  this 
presupposes, and its necessary connection to legal practice, Fuller remains open to an attack 
that depicts his procedural morality as merely incidental to the use of law as a political tool 
by legal officials. This attack would depict the moral implications of the rule of law as a 
contingent  byproduct  of  the  essential  function  of  law  as  an  instrume nt  for  political 
governance. It is available to Fuller’s opponent if they accept the possibility that political 
systems are not necessarily conditioned by reciprocity. 
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This reveals a failure, on Fuller’s part, to clearly and fully articulate the dynamic 
relationship between his procedural morality and the substantive morality of law. In my view, 
Fuller was right to consider the broader context of political reciprocity as conditioning the 
reasons  for  action  embedded  within  legal  practice,  and  therefore  the  concept  of  law. 
However, the sparse treatment of what grounds this reciprocity in political practice left him 
open to a challenge that would sideline this aspect of his thought as a contingent feature of 
legal  systems  and  instead  focus  enquiry  on  the  subjective  reasons  of  legal  officials  for 
accepting and applying the rule of law. Kramer, for example, develops Hart’s claim that the 
rule of law has no necessary moral status by arguing that legal officials can adopt a rule of 
recognition, incorporating the rule of law, as a binding reason for action based on merely 
self-interested reasons.27 The legal subject may simply be given ‘the ability and opportunity 
to obey’ in order to achieve the purpose of political control.28 This approach underscores the 
significance of law as an instrument for subjecting human conduct to governance by rules, 
regardless of whether the rules are adopted for moral or non-moral reasons. Thus, Raz is able 
to say that Fuller’s eight precepts of legality are a virtue of law; but not a moral virtue.29 Law 
does have a function, like a knife, and the principles of legality enhance the efficacy of law 
for fulfilling that function, like the sharpness of a knife. But they are not intrinsically moral 
principles because, like a knife, law can be used for both good and evil purposes. 
This focus on the subjective reasons of legal officials for adopting the rule of law is 
crucial. It allows the particular moral significance proposed by Fuller to be characterised as 
contingent, depending on whether legal  officials accept and apply the eight desiderata for 
moral or non-moral reasons. The eight desiderata can then be seen as enhancing the efficacy 
of law in achieving political ends because the focus of enquiry has turned to the moral quality 
of the motivations of legal officials, rather than what would constitute a good reason for 
action for those officials in the political context entailed by Fuller’s understanding of political 
reciprocity. 
In the background to Fuller’s notion of political reciprocity is the idea that the value 
of legality concerns the realisation of the ‘rule of law’, rather than the ‘rule of men’. Fuller is 
concerned with the embedded nature of legal practice, as a form of good social governance 
which derives its point and purpose from political community. But he needs to show that this 
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good social governance involves evaluative moral standards that are central to the practical 
rationality  of  legal  practice,  and  therefore  to  the  idea  of  law,  in  a  way  that  necessarily 
conditions reasons for action within that practice. But what is it about legal practice that 
conditions the reasons of officials in that practice? Why should we focus on the reasons that 
legal  officials  ought  to  have  in  accepting  and  applying  the  rule  of  law,  rather  than  the 
subjective reasons that they do have? 
Fuller is aware that an answer turns on the social role of legal officials within legal 
practice.30 His  argument  turns  on  the  justificatory  basis  for  the  official’s  role  and  their 
consequent commitments within political practice. This explains his emphasis on political 
reciprocity. He wants to establish that the reasons for action appropriate to this social role are 
conditioned  by  socio-political  commitments  that  are  necessary  features  of  political 
community. But he does not adequately consider the nature of these commitments. If those 
commitments are necessary, then I think Fuller is committed to saying they follow from 
commitments  to  achieving  a  political  common  good  in  circumstances  of  social 
interdependency.  This  means  Fuller’s  arguments  for  a  procedural  morality  of  law  would 
presuppose an important dependency on a substantive morality of law, whereby the proper 
aim of law is the achievement of a political common good. 
We need to develop this relationship between the procedural and substantive morality 
of law in more detail if we are to establish Fuller’s necessary connection between law and 
morals.  MacIntyre  can  help  in  this  endeavour.  From  MacIntyre’s  standpoint,  the 
interdependencies between the procedural and substantive morality of law can be uncovered 
by  appreciating  law  as  a  ‘social  practice’  in  the  context  of  a  political  community,  with 
socially established reasons for action embedded in its traditions and institutions. With this 
approach, I will argue that MacIntyre’s thought can explain Fuller’s moral intuitions about 
law. He provides resources to elucidate the connections between human agency, the rule of 
law, and the political common good; these provide a necessary justificatory background to 
Fuller’s procedural morality of law. 
 
C.  SOCIAL PRACTICES AND THE COMMON GOOD 
Fuller thinks jurisprudence implicates an enquiry into why the application of law can be 
considered by legal officials to have binding authority; and also why legal subjects have good 
reasons to share this belief and treat law as an obligatory reason for action. Both sides should 
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be in view because the achievement of law’s function requires co-operation. Actions on the 
basis  of  law  are  intelligible  as  intentional  human  actions  when  they  are  justifiable  by 
reference to  good reasons for acting.31 We need to understand the dependencies of those 
reasons on the socio-political context in which they occur as part of legal practice. In this 
section, I give an account of MacIntyre’s understanding of a social practice, and sketch the 
relationship  of  the  different  social  practices  within  a  political  community  to  a  political 
common good. This will provide the political context in which legal practice is embedded, as 
a form of governance by which a political community can order itself in pursuit of a political 
common good. 
According  to  MacIntyre,  humans  learn  about  what  ends  are  good  to  pursue  by 
practice, with experiences of achievement and failure. That education can transform desires 
and enable the human agent to distinguish between ends to achieve as mere objects of desire, 
from ends genuinely good to desire in the circumstances. What MacIntyre calls a ‘social 
practice’  plays  a  crucial  role.  It  is  a  social  context  that  has  a  causative  influence  on  an 
individual’s reasons for action because in such contexts the ends to be chosen are accountable 
and subordinate to common ends to be achieved. Within this social context, human agents 
learn to distinguish what is simply an end qua object of individual desire, from what is a good 
end  by  reference  to  mutual  standards  internal  to  the  practice.  They  exercise  practical 
rationality not simply qua autonomous individual but qua self-directing participant. 
MacIntyre’s  use  of  ‘social  practice’  is  quite  different  to  how  other  theorists  may 
understand that term. He defines a ‘practice’ as: 
[…]  any  coherent  and  complex  form  of  socially  established  co-operative  activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of 
trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially 
definitive  of,  that  form  of  activity,  with  the  result  that  human  powers  to  achieve 
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excellence, and human conceptions of ends and goods involved, are systematically 
extended.32 
Chess is an example. Think of a child, bribed to play with the promise of candy if she wins. 
While the bribe serves to motivate her to learn to play by the rules, she has good reason to 
cheat or otherwise instrumentalise the game insofar as the bribe remains the chief motivation 
for playing. If she learns to enjoy the standards of excellence internal to chess, including the 
skills and competitive challenges involved, she has good reason to internalise and act by the 
rules of the game. This example introduces a key distinction between g oods internal to the 
activity of a practice and goods external to it. 33 That distinction enables MacIntyre to isolate 
the role of mutual commitments and obligations that result from the constitutive dependency 
of the individual good concerned on the ends of the common enterprise. It will be crucial to 
understand the social nature of reasons for action within legal practice. 
Internal goods are shared purposes and standards of excellence internal to the practice 
in that they define what it means to do the acti vity well and can serve as intelligible shared 
motivations for co-operative participation in that practice. This telos of the practice may 
involve a complex range of different satisfactions experienced in performing the activity 
well. But the pleasure from the activity is not the good itself. ‘[E]njoyment supervenes upon 
the successful activity in such a way that the activity achieved and the activity enjoyed are 
one and the same state’ – pursued together.34 Internal goods incorporate the extension of 
human skills, capacities and virtues involved in the activity, as well as the activity done well 
and any consequent product.35 These are common goods because ‘their achievement is a good 
for the whole community who participate in the practice’.36 In other words, internal goods are 
at least partially shareable rather than mutually exclusive, and shareable in the sense that their 
achievement  by  one  benefits  the  whole  practice.  Achieving  them  requires  mutual 
commitments to the internal standards of success for the common enterprise.37 
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But are games, like chess, really analogous to other forms of social practice?38 For 
many social activities, we do not typically have a choice whether to participate. Also, the 
analogy with games may fail, as Yack argues, to capture ‘the unavoidable interest in – and 
competition  to  shape  –  the  intrinsic  correctness  of  standards  of  justice  in  political 
communities because it extrapolates from the relatively limited concerns of game players’.39 
These are important concerns, but they do not impugn MacIntyre’s analogy. He is identifying 
human associations with a common property. ‘Social practices’ have internal standards which 
are constitutive of and indispensable to achieving the shared ends of the activity in question. 
They involve standards and virtues that are constitutive of common goods to be achieved, 
causing the socially acceptable reasons for action of participants to be partially independent 
of  individuals’  desires. 40  He  opposes  this  with  mutual  advantage  co-operation  where 
‘individuals, each pursuing the satisfaction of their own wants and needs, agree in accepting a 
rule governed framework for their activities, each with his or her individual aim of thereby 
protecting his or her security in the pursuit of his or her satisfactions’.41 Both are instantiated 
in social life, and to greater or lesser degrees in different activities or in the same activity. 
To illustrate what MacIntyre means by a ‘practice’, consider what human activities 
exhibit characteristics of being motivated by common goods. The examples MacIntyre gives 
are wide-ranging, including chess, football, farming, building, architecture, fishing, painting, 
sculpture, poetry, drama, gymnastics, music, military service, war, medicine, mathematics, 
physics, chemistry, biology, history, philosophy, enduring friendships and family life, law, 
religion, politics, and ethics. Some are productive, some games, some intellectual enquiries, 
and  some  concern  healthy  communal  life.  Many  exhibit  interdependencies  with  other 
practices. Their internal standards may either constitute or depend on achievements in other 
practices.42 For example, as I will argue, the ends of politics constitute standards internal to 
legal practice; and architectural standards rely on possible achievements in construction. Still, 
each activity is structured, in its particular form, by shared standards of excellence that 
provide  reasons  for  individuals  to  act  as  co -operative  participants.  They  contrast  with 
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associations,  like  investment  clubs  or  other  partnerships,  which  may  exhibit  mutual 
advantage rationality because they are means for achieving the separable ends of partners.43 
Acting on mutual advantage in a practice has the effect of instrumentalising the 
practice  for  individual  ends,  only  contingently  related  to  its  share d  standards.  Thus, 
MacIntyre distinguishes internal goods from characteristic external goods, like prestige, 
status, power, and money. 44 External goods may follow from successful participation in 
practices, but they need not. They provide vital resources fo r developing practices, but they 
do not define the internal standards of success. Further, the possession and enjoyment of 
external goods by one person tends to be mutually exclusive to that of another, making them 
potential objects of rivalry that undermi ne the necessary co -operation in a practice. An 
individual practice is always in danger of being instrumentalised for external goods in ways 
that corrupt and undermine its common ends. Whether or not this is a bad thing will depend 
on the priority to be given to the internal goods of that individual practice as a constituent 
part of individual or communal life. But internal goods need to be pursued for their own sake, 
not simply as means for attaining external goods, if we are to adequately internalise thos e 
reasons for action supporting the achievement of the shared purposes as our own reasons. 
The difference between the co-operative activity itself and its authoritative direction 
leads MacIntyre to differentiate between practices and institutions. 45 The practice is the 
constitutive activity itself, whereas its institutional form develops to support that activity by 
enforcing institutional rules and administering external goods for the benefit of the practice. 
Practices typically require institutional form to  be sustained. But institutions are always in 
danger of being dominated by a bureaucratic rationality, or corrupted in ways that orientate 
them towards external goods as the predominant end. In these circumstances, institutional 
rules may no longer embody  or support the ‘rules of the practice’ which reflect the general 
standards of conduct conducive for achieving its internal goods.46 This instrumentalises the 
practice for exterior purposes and creates a conflict with the practical rationality motivating 
the mutual commitments of participants. 
To external observers, a practice may seem to be constituted by  its institutional rules 
and form. But it is not the rules per se that define a practice. Rules change and develop to 
improve its functioning. The internal  goods provide standards by which the rules can be 
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evaluated, even when those rules might be constitutive means for achieving those internal 
goods.  Consider,  for  example,  the  rules  of  chess.  Those  rules  constitute  the  competitive 
standards of success involved, but it is the value of those rules in enabling the competitive 
challenges which provides the point and purpose of the rules. The internal goods and rules of 
the  game  may  be  mutually  constitutive,  but  the  internal  goods  provide  reason  for  rule-
following. When a participant’s motivation for engaging in a practice fixates on external 
goods, the binding authority of institutional rules, and the officials and institutions applying 
those rules, will have primary significance for orientating their action in the practice.47 This 
follows  from  the  inability  to  fully  internalise  the  goods  of  the  practice  as  reason  for 
conformity with the rules. If a chess player wants to quit because she unwittingly made a bad 
move, she is only following the rules to win and not for the shared standards of the game. In 
contrast, a participant motivated by internal goods will recognise the rules and requisite 
virtues as constitutive means for co -operating with other participants to achieving them. 48 
This  allegiance  to  the  joint  enterpr ise  secures  commitment  to  the  virtues  of  a  good 
practitioner and to the mutual standards of the practice. 
The conduct and motivations of a participant can be held accountable by other 
participants through the giving and receiving of reasons for action. 49 We  can ask other 
participants why they acted in the way that they did, and hold the reasons that they give 
accountable to the shared standards of the practice if they are committed to being a co -
operative  participant.  The  standards  for  judging  such  reasons  d erive  from  the  shared 
standards of achievement in the practice. These standards are refined by the experience of 
what is most conducive to the practice functioning well over time, by reference to the 
achievement of its internal goods. Thus, the material co nditions of a practice, with its 
institutional form, are transformed through thought and discourse into a tradition. 50 So, for 
example, within legal practice the judge deciding a case will be informed by past judicial 
thought on the legal issues at stake. In the same way, the understandings of law expressed by 
Hart have an intelligible relation to those of Austin and Bentham, and even to Aquinas. 
Understandings of a practice can be understood and debated between contemporaries and 
through different generations of participants. The systematic extension and transformation of 
the internal goods of a practice are connected to this dialogue between participants over time 
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concerning the best understanding of its standards so far and how to best achieve them. There 
is a continual engagement between the understanding of a practice by its participants and the 
experience of an activity’s functioning. 
Now we need to place what has been said about ‘social practices’ in the context of 
individual and communal life to appreciate how MacIntyre would understand politics as a 
social  practice  aiming  at  a  political  common  good.  The  concept  of  a  ‘social  practice’ 
identifies activities in which constituents of the overall good of an individual are dependent 
on  a  co-operative  social  life.  MacIntyre  contextualises  the  web  of  interdependent  social 
practices and activities a person engages in, some chosen and some not, within a narrative life 
structure.51 The capacity for practical reasoning allows the human agent to extrapolate from 
their reasons for particular actions, in pursuit of particular goods, to thinking more abstractly 
about an overall good that can guide the attainment of more immediate goods in the context 
of the life they desire to live.52 
According to MacIntyre, the ordinary  person cannot avoid raising the questions: 
‘What is my good?’ and ‘How is it to be achieved?’ Competing desires prompt decisions 
between  different  proximate  ends,  and  opposing  demands  from  different  practices  and 
activities require consideration of the part each will have in her life. These decisions may 
form as implicit presuppositions to the activities and motives characterising how she comes 
to live her life by inclination. However, the counterfactual, of what she would have done had 
she  been  better  informed  about  her  overall  good  and  its  significance  for  her  immediate 
actions,  is  always  relevant  for  evaluating  her  action.  In  other  words,  her  capacity  to 
instantiate greater directedness in achieving her overall good is always relevant. That greater 
directedness requires some degree of deliberation, perhaps through critical reflection on her 
past actions and narrative so far. At different points in her life, circumstances will prompt her 
to question the overall good to which she is committed so far and redirect her intentions and 
desires in developing her life narrative by future action. The articulation and experience of 
this  narrative  unity  can  be  lacking,  but  it  is  necessary  for  humans  to  flourish  with 
purposiveness to their life.53 
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This describes what MacIntyre calls the ‘narrative quest’ of each human being for an 
overall good. That narrative is grounded in the roles, experiences, and character formation 
provided in social practices and the material conditions of the human being.54 The human 
identity is not reducible to the roles played in social practices; however these practices play 
an  integral  part  in  constituting  the  human  character  over  time,  and  grounding  future 
aspirations. MacIntyre’s narrative structure, therefore, identifies a teleological character to 
human life extending beyond social practices in pursuit of an overall good, but crucially 
depending  on  social  practices  for  constituents  of  this  good.  The  commitment  to  a  life 
narrative which encompasses the internal goods of different social practices means that the 
individual is also committed to achieving a political common good as an important part of 
their own good. 
Thus, the question ‘What is my good?’ can often implicate the question ‘What is our 
good?’  The  need  to  order  the  different  activities  and  practices  as  part  of  a  political 
community gives rise to a need for joint practical reasoning through political discourse if 
answers to these questions are to be pursued co-operatively.55 MacIntyre asks us to consider a 
political community that: 
[…] exists for the sake of the creation and sustaining of that form of communal life 
into which the goods of each particular practice may be integrated so that both each 
individual and the community as a whole may lead a life informed by these goods.56 
MacIntyre believes that the need for individuals to sustain co-operative relations in different 
social practices requires a corresponding social commitment to sustain this form of political 
community. As a consequence, political activity becomes normatively structured as a ‘social 
practice’, with a telos constituted by the need for political co-operation to achieve certain 
common ends. These common ends, or internal goods to political practice, are associated 
with the task of integrating the different practices of a political community, for the good of 
that community and as the social conditions for individual human flourishing. MacIntyre 
refers to that telos as the ‘political common good’. This term captures the aim to provide the 
best possible ordering to all the particular goods to be achieved in the community, through 
the integrative function of political practice. In what follows, I want to consider how we 
might think of law as a ‘social practice’, deriving the reciprocity which Fuller describes from 
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its supporting role for the pursuit of this political common good. My claim is that this can 
provide  the  necessary  political  background  to  explain  why  we  should  accept  Fuller’s 
argument that legal practice is necessarily conditioned by ‘political reciprocity’. 
 
D.  LAW AS A SOCIAL PRACTICE 
Despite notable efforts to account for the relationship between law as ‘reason for acting’ and 
law as ‘social phenomenon’,57 there is still insufficient attention given to the role of sociality 
in legal practice and the intelligibility of reasons for action within socio-political context. 
This lacuna forms an implicit background to Fuller’s claims concerning the reciprocity that 
conditions the role of legal officials. MacIntyre’s emphasis on human sociality can provide a 
helpful corrective. In particular, his concept of a ‘social practice’ can identify the important 
role of internal goods for constituting the co-operative nature of reasons for action within 
legal practice. This can help to make sense of the connection that Fuller draws between the 
purposive nature of legal activity and the reciprocity between legal participants. The activities 
involved in legal practice would be intelligible by reference to how participants should act to 
sustain the co-operative purposes of that practice – or in other words, its internal goods. 
Describing law as a ‘social practice’ entails that it is a purposive activity performed, 
in some sense, together. The ‘togetherness’ is the key problem. My claim is that it arises from 
the  need  to  achieve  certain  internal  goods  to  legal  activity,  which  can  explain  why  the 
motivations  and  actions  of  participants  are  accountable  to  co-operative  standards  of 
achievement. Legal practice exhibits the co-operative rationality of a social practice because 
the pursuit of these goods requires a sufficient degree of mutual commitment between legal 
officials and subjects, embodied in social standards. In addition, the achievement of these 
goods can be systematically extended by an improvement in the quality and extent of this 
mutual  commitment  –  what  Fuller  calls  the  fidelity  to  law.  It  is  by  reference  to  the 
achievement of these internal  goods,  and the constitutive co-operative standards for their 
achievement, that participants have a basis for distinguishing good and bad reasons for action 
within legal practice. 
To consider this argument in more detail, we need to flesh out the activities involved 
in legal practice. The most obvious activities are the making, interpreting, and applying of 
legal rules to provide a form of governance that supports the practice of politics. In this sense, 
law is a subsidiary practice. Its purpose is derivative from its role as a distinct means for 
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achieving political ends. But the achievement of these political ends, through law, requires 
the co-operation of legal subjects as active participants in legal practice. As described in 
Section  B,  Fuller  understands  the  efficacy  of  law  to  be  supported  by  the  co-operative 
dispositions of both legal officials and legal subjects to act with fidelity to law. Of course, 
legal subjects may not choose whether to participate in legal practice, in the sense that a 
political regime can apply law through the imposition of force. But the active participation of 
legal  subjects  is  still  necessary  for  the  following  reasons.  First,  the  efficacy  of  law,  in 
achieving its political ends, depends on a general belief in its legitimacy by legal subjects 
which can sustain their co-operative obedience to legal rules as binding reasons for action. 
Second,  that  efficacy  will  also  depend  on  how  well  legal  subjects  guide  their  individual 
conduct by reference to legal rules. 
We can make sense of Fuller’s notion of reciprocity from this supporting role that law 
plays for political practice. My claim is that the interdependence between the activities of 
legal officials and legal subjects, for achieving the ends of political practice, constitute law as 
a  practice  in  the  sense  MacIntyre  describes.  Legal  practice  is  both  a  purposive  and  co-
operative  activity  because  it  involves  an  extension  of  co-operative  skills,  virtues,  and 
standards  of  excellence  to  realise  a  political  order  aiming  at  the  common  good. 58 The 
‘internal goods’ of that practice are those ends that capture the common value of law, as a 
distinct  form  of  governance,  to  all  citizens  in  the  political  community.  In  this  context, 
political reciprocity means that legal officials and legal subjects should act in their respective 
roles as participants in legal practice with an appropriate respect for these internal goods, to 
sustain and extend its value as a co-operative enterprise. 
Consider the role of the legal subject. Within legal practice, the legal subject learns to 
distinguish between what is simply instrumentally good qua individual, from what is good 
qua legal subject.59 This practical formation differentiates between those who treat law as a 
binding reason for action only insofar as it is likely to be enforced; and those who grasp the 
value of the internal goods of legal practice as reason for them being law -abiding citizens. 
The practice of law is fundamental for providing the social conditions for developing and 
sustaining human capacities as responsible agents. This means that broader political and 
moral standards are relevant to the internal standards of legal practice, but in a man ner 
particular to the role of law in society and of the person  qua legal subject. The judgment of 
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what is good qua legal subject thus depends on judgments of what is good qua human being 
in the context of law’s role in a community. 
These  judgments  qua  legal  subject  inform  what  is  good  qua  official  within  legal 
practice. The official’s role is dependent on the reciprocal and justificatory relation it bears to 
legal subjects. If the official restricts their reasons for action to what is good qua individual, 
they ignore the social dependency of their actions within legal practice. When they invoke 
law  as  an  authoritative  reason  for  action,  this  has  social  significance  connected  to  the 
standards for pursuing its internal goods. In particular, that authoritative reason for action is 
necessarily expressed as a justification to other participants, which is parasitic on a broader 
justification for the enforcement of law which can sustain mutual fidelity to law.60 
As Simmonds points out, the judge has a paradigmatic ro le  in  law’s  justificatory 
force.61 The act of making a judgment is a social act, requiring the judge to appeal implicitly 
to  the  social  reasons  for  action  embodied  in  a  rule,  and  its  nature  as  ‘law’,  to  provide 
adequate justification for their judgment. This involves a type of ‘reflexivity’ in the practice 
of law, whereby the application of law as an authoritative reason for action relies on an 
implicit  appeal  to  the  nature  or  function  of  law  as  an  evaluative  background  to  its 
justification. Although it might be possible, as Hart allows, for an official to apply law for 
selfish reasons, this misses the point. The reasons provided in a judgment are subject to 
justificatory standards embodied in the practice. A bad application of law can be identified by 
reference to these standards, and this has the potential to bear on a participant’s reasons for 
recognising its binding authority and guiding their conduct accordingly. 
Given that the reasons  of officials  are parasitic on the justificatory standards that 
support the co-operative effort of legal practice, then Finnis may be right to identify a ‘focal 
instance’ of law – where law aims at the common good. However, I will understand this 
‘practical viewpoint’, defining the ‘focal instance’, as that which is consistent with the shared 
evaluative standards for the practical reasoning of participants within legal practice.62 The 
internal goods of legal practice provide these intelligible justificatory standards. In what 
follows, I will argue that these internal goods are associated with the capacity for law to order 
the political community towards the political common good (the substantive morality of law), 
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while  respecting  legal  subjects  as  active  and  responsible  participants  in  that  effort  (the 
procedural morality of law). 
 
E.  SUBSTANTIVE MORALITY OF LAW 
The substantive morality of law concerns what ends a community should pursue through law, 
and therefore incorporates the supporting role law plays for politics. The support of political 
practice is  the most fundamental  reason for legal  activity. Without  the need or desire to 
pursue common ends together, there would be no good reason for governance to distinguish it 
from arbitrary authority. Even where the reason for political community is understood by 
reference to its capacity to instantiate a degree of freedom for the individual to pursue their 
own ends, this necessarily implicates a common good that explains why there is political 
governance at all. In that understanding of political community, the common good is the 
general and stable framework of rules that can mediate between individuals to enable that 
freedom.63 However, if political practice is best understood as a voluntary association, based 
on a mutual advantage not grounded by any common good, then the reciprocity between legal 
officials and legal subjects must be seen as contingent. It cannot be a necessary feature of a 
legal system. This is why Fuller’s procedural morality is intrinsically linked to a claim that 
there  is  some  political  common  good  that  provides  a  justificatory  basis  for  the  political 
community. The importance of these political conditions for the continued existence of law, 
as a purposive social phenomenon, forms the background to Fuller’s notion of reciprocity in 
legal practice. 
At minimum, law is an indispensible means to achieve shared conditions for order and 
stability in a political community. But the reciprocity involved in legal practice is connected 
to the political expectation that any end pursued for the community should be capable of 
justification by reference to it being good for that community. The ordering of the community 
by law for achieving the common good provides the practical context from which the good-
making  characteristics  of  a  law  can  be  identified  and  brought  to  bear  on  law-making, 
interpretation  and  application.  It  informs  the  rationale  of  a  law,  providing  the  practical 
evaluative context necessary for officials and legal subjects to rationally engage with what 
legal rules require in concrete circumstances. 
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Central  to  an  understanding  of  law  is  an  appreciation  of  what  it  means  for  legal 
practice to function well as a purposive activity. I am arguing that this ‘functioning’ needs to 
be understood in light of the functioning of a co-operative political practice. Thus, we need to 
appreciate the functioning of legal practice by reference to the situation when laws aim, in 
good faith, to achieve a shared understanding of the common good. In those circumstances, 
by understanding the practical good-making reasons for a law, it is possible for the legal 
subject to apprehend the communal ends the law is designed to achieve, as good ends for 
them to pursue qua citizen and for their own overall good. The legal subject can make these 
communal ends their own, and thereby participate more fully in a shared understanding of the 
political common good. 
The extent of that participation does not stop with law-abiding citizens. It extends to 
the participation of citizens in those social virtues and goods critical for a co-operative form 
of  political  community. 64  Laws  against  littering,  for  example,  can  be  internalised  as 
communal standards reaching beyond their legal ambit to promote communal cleanliness. 
Like the child who learns to play by the rules of chess for the excellence of the game, it is 
possible for the legal subject to be formed through law to standards of communal excellence. 
Legal practice, therefore, can involve the systematic extension of skills, capacities and virtues 
of lawmakers, judges, lawyers, and citizens, facilitating the realisat ion of the common good 
through law. This extension is reinforced by the internalisation of that common good by legal 
subjects as an intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) standard and essential ingredient for their own 
flourishing. 
This understanding of what it  means for law to function well, in establishing and 
sustaining a co-operative form of political community, is fundamental to the purposive and 
co-operative nature of legal practice. Without this type of claim about the purpose of legal 
practice, Fuller is  not able to establish the necessary importance of reciprocity to legal 
practice, as a co-operative social activity. As a consequence, he cannot establish his case for a 
necessary connection between law and morals. Instead, from Hart’s perspective, it is open to 
interpret his debate with Fuller as dependent on a prior question about the morality of a 
political regime. If politics is not conditioned by internal standards for achieving some form 
of political common good, then the concept of law must be open to the possibility that law 
may be used for evil. There may be some good consequences in respect of human agency 
because legal subjects are given the opportunity to obey. But these consequences can be 
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treated as merely incidental to whatever reasons (including selfish reasons) a legal official 
may have for applying law. Following this reasoning, Kramer argues that if we impute the 
moral value of the common good to law we should be willing to impute wickedness – as law 
can be used for either.65 
To respond, we need to discern different senses in which a means can be valuable. In 
the sense used by Kramer, a means is only valuable by reference to whatever end it is used to 
achieve. In a related sense, a means can be valuable as a type that has an aptitude or 
constitutive importance for achieving particular ends. The perfection in which this aptitude 
consists  is  not  secondary,  but  primary  to  the  means.  Thus,  the  claim  of  a  necessary 
connection between law and the common good does not entail that law can only be used  to 
achieve that good. Rather, law involves an aptitude and indispensability for achieving the 
common good which is systematically extended by a well-ordered legal practice. The counter 
argument, from the legal positivist, is that law is just as serviceabl e for good as for evil 
purposes. 
To decide between these two positions, we need to reiterate that law is not simply an 
activity engaged in by those with authority. Legal rules must be apt to provide authoritative 
reasons for action to legal subjects, so they may effectively guide their conduct to achieve the 
communal ends of the law. With this in mind, Aquinas calls a law contrary to the common 
good a ‘perversion of law’66. As explained in Section B, Fuller is wary of the suggestion that 
there is any such ‘higher law’. But we can explain Aquinas’ ‘perversion of law’ by the fact 
that the reasons for action involved are directed towards external goods (like power) rather 
than internal goods to legal practice. They do not aim at a justification to all participants 
according to shared standards within the practice. In this way, there is what Alexy calls a 
‘performative contradiction’ between the justificatory basis for political and legal practice, 
and the use of law.67 In the circumstances, the use of law objectifies and instrumentalises the 
necessary co-operation of other participants for contingent purposes that are not shared. Like 
the child playing chess for candy, the reasons for action within legal practice become relative 
to external purposes. Law is only treated as a social practice relative to the purposes of the 
ruler or government or officials, and is therefore better described as a non -focal instance, or 
perhaps an anti-social practice. 
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The possibility of serviceability for extrinsic purposes does not impugn the fact that 
law is a co-operative activity that presupposes constitutive commitments to internal standards 
by which this instrumentalisation can be judged. In the same way, while a friendship may be 
useful for extending one’s professional network, the use of a friend merely for this end can be 
judged to affect the quality of friendship by the standards of reciprocity implicit in friendship. 
Both law and friendship are co-operative practices which bring internal standards to bear on 
the actions and reasons of the participants. It is only by abstracting from the nature of law as 
a social practice, with a socio-political reciprocity sustained by the common task of achieving 
a common good, that Hart can describe law as merely instrumental for the isolated reasons of 
officials who use it. As the analogy of friendship depicts, the use of law in this way, based on 
reasons that abstract from the purposive social activity, does not cease to be subject to the 
critical practical standards of that social activity. 
 
F.  PROCEDURAL MORALITY OF LAW 
In  contrast  to  the  substantive  morality  of  law,  which  involves  the  aptitude  of  law  for 
achieving a wide variety of communal ends, the procedural morality of law is connected to 
specific ends with moral value. These specific ends are associated with how human persons 
should be bound to the common ends of a political community. 
Finnis  subsumes  this  procedural  morality  within  his  substantive  morality  of  law, 
based on his theory of the common good and justice.68 He thereby provides a corrective to 
Fuller’s attempts to distinguish his procedural morality as internal to legal activity from the 
substantive ends of law as more external to legal activity.69 The substantive ends of law do 
become an internal part of the activity and form of legal governance. If this were not the case, 
there would be no reason to claim that the reciprocity between officials and legal subjects, 
grounded by the common good, is a necessary feature of the proper functioning of legal 
practice. The substantive ends of particular laws may be diverse, but it is the capacity for 
those ends to be understood and justified as constituents of a common good that sustains the 
reciprocity in legal practice. 
Nevertheless, Fuller is right to clearly differentiate the role of his procedural morality 
of law. Subsuming it within the substantive morality of law obscures the distinct relationship 
between law and the precepts of legality, compared to the variety of ends for which laws are 
made. In addition, it can perhaps confuse law as  a distinct means, compared to other means 
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for governance, by which a political community might direct the actions of its citizens to 
those common ends.70 It is therefore important to recognise the distinct role of co -operative 
standards, formed in response to the question of how human persons ought to be bound to 
communal ends, for shaping the institutional form of law. 
My  claim  is  that  the  eight  precepts  are  rules  of  legal  practice,  or  good  legal 
craftsmanship, which are intelligible by reference to the ac hievement of internal goods 
associated with this moral question. These internal goods are of a secondary order because 
they presuppose communal ends to which citizens should be bound. The question of how to 
bind follows upon authoritative political decisio ns concerning what substantive ends law 
should pursue. Hart’s description of secondary rules is helpful here. The eight precepts of 
legality  involve  rules  ‘about  rules’. 71  They  are  rules  that  structure  the  crafting  and 
administration of law within legal practice. 
We need to depart from Hart, however, to stress that these ‘rules about rules’ develop 
according  to  practical  reasoning  about  how  laws  should  be  crafted  and  administered  to 
sustain  the  co-operative  pursuit  of  internal  goods  to  legal  practice.  They  are  only  fully 
intelligible as part of legal practice if we can explain the common value of these principles of 
legality for all participants in the practice, and thus why participants should be committed to 
acting co-operatively to sustain fidelity to these principles. What then is the common moral 
value of these eight desiderata? 
Simmonds  claims that  the  rule  of  law  instantiates  the  moral  value  of  freedom  as 
independence.72 This aspect of freedom is not concerned with the range of options available 
to an agent, but with whether such options are subject to the direct will or power of another. It 
‘distinguishes the slave from the free man’ and is realised, Simmonds argues, to the extent we 
are governed by law complying with the eight desiderata.73 This way of describing the moral 
value underpinning the rule of law can be contrasted with an account that would also 
underscore  the  potential  enhancement  of  responsible  agency.  Missing  from  Simmonds’ 
freedom as independence is a treatment of the capacity for the agent to participate in the 
practical rationality of a law and to act on an understanding of why it is good for them. In 
what  follows,  I  will  argue  that  the  eight  desiderata  can  enhance  both  freedom  as 
independence and the capacity for responsible agency. The two are not mutually exclusive 
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and  can  be  captured  within  a  broader  account  of  freedom,  which  I  call  ‘freedom  as 
dominion’. However, the degree to which the rule of law can instantiate the more limited 
‘freedom as independence’ or a broader ‘freedom as dominion’ depends crucially on what 
differentiates a focal instance from a non-focal instance of law – whether law aims at the 
common good. 
In my opinion, the instantiation of a focal instance of law, realised by the ordering of 
legal subjects to understand and act for the common good, allows for the rule of law to 
achieve a form of ‘freedom as dominion’ for legal subjects.74 This is more consistent with 
Fuller’s claim that ‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules 
involves of necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible 
agent,  capable  of  understanding  and  following  rules,  and  answerable  for  his  defaults’.75 
Freedom as dominion involves the ability of human agents to develop an understanding of the 
overall good for their life and to exercise rational direction over their action to achieve that 
overall  good  within  their  community.  It  includes  the  capacity  to  act  and  flourish  as 
responsible agents, as well as the degree of liberty to choose between different options falling 
within this rational direction. However, it also includes freedom as independence because the 
experience of our rational dominion has a dependency on the extent to which it is subject to 
the will of another person. 
Together, these dimensions of freedom as dominion derive from the human capacity 
to be what MacIntyre calls independent practical reasoners.76 The capacity for independent 
practical reasoning enables human beings to comprehend the practical rationality of law and 
to put law into  practice. No rule can treat all potential contingencies and all rules require 
practical  reason  to  determine  their  application  to  particulars. 77  Independent  practical 
reasoners, though, have the capacity to determine whether or not and in what way a rule 
applies to specific actions and to guide their conduct in following a rule. This requires them 
to understand how a rule might apply to their performance of an action given a broader 
normative understanding of the potential grounding reasons for that rule and  the way those 
reasons apply to action in different factual circumstances. As a consequence, the independent 
practical reasoner is able to direct themselves to the ends of a particular law, guided by the 
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potential  grounding  reasons  for  that  law.  Consider  the  following  example  given  by 
Rodriguez-Blanco: 
Let us suppose that we are climbing a mountain guided by an expert. Before we start 
climbing, he gives us a set of basic safety rules such as ‘do not pull the rope’, ‘do not 
pass the person who is ahead of you’, and so on. We begin climbing and do what he 
tells us to do, he shouts ‘throw the rope’, ‘put on the harness’, ‘small and steady steps, 
please’, ‘don’t look back’. We follow the successive steps of the action ‘climbing the 
mountain’ following the safety rules. But whilst doing the actions my harness breaks 
and I need to adjust my conduct. I take my scarf off and make a harness with it. If I 
am asked why did you do that? The naïve or basic answer is ‘I needed to be safe’. To 
be safe when one climbs is the  grounding reason or logos of the set  of rules for 
climbing safely. Therefore, what guided me in my actions was not the rule, but a set 
of facts about the world together with a grasping of the grounding reasons as good-
making characteristics of the rules, ie it is good to be safe. 
This  example  points  to  the  importance  of  law  for  active  guidance  of  individual  human 
conduct to the achievement of communal ends. Rule by law can provide an effective means 
to  co-ordinate  the  diverse  projects  and  actions  of  individuals  in  a  community  precisely 
because of this capacity for individuals, as responsible agents, to guide their conduct by what 
they take to be the grounding reasons for particular laws.78 
The enhancement of that guiding function of law can make sense of the  moral value 
of the eight desiderata. Take, for example, the requirements that law be as intelligible as 
possible. The capacity for legal subjects to guide their action by the law is enhanced by the 
extent to which law fulfils these requirements. Legal subjects will find it easier to understand 
the grounding reasons for a law, and thereby guide their action in accordance with the 
communal ends at stake by making those ends their own. 79 Thus, the value of the eight 
desiderata can be rendered intelligible as part of the co-operative endeavour to enhance this 
potential for legal subjects to understand and guide their conduct by the practical rationality 
(or grounding reasons) of legal rules. In this way, the procedural morality of law is connected 
to its substantive morality. The eight desiderata are part of the form of law that conditions its 
aptitude for directing legal subjects to the common good. That aptitude entails the fulfilment 
of a degree of freedom as dominion for legal subjects. If law is to serve its  function as 
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guiding individual conduct to the achievement of communal ends, then its rules should be 
crafted in accordance with the eight desiderata, and thus in a way that respects human beings 
as  responsible  agents  who  can  consider  how  to  best  order  their  actions  and  projects  for 
achieving the communal ends at stake. 
This respect for the rational dominion of legal subjects is not simply instrumental for 
law’s efficacy. It is also indispensible to the common good and constitutive of normal human 
flourishing.80 The crafting of law in closer compliance with the eight desiderata provides 
greater freedom as dominion for the citizen to order her life narrative, toward her overall 
good and in relation to her understanding of the common good (based on the substanti ve 
content of law). The instantiation of this freedom as dominion forms part of the substantive 
morality of law because it is an indispensible constituent of the common good in its own 
right.  But it may  also  be distinguished from  other communal  ends,  as sp ecific to the 
secondary rules that structure the institutional form of legal practice. This captures Fuller’s 
central claim, that the institutional form of law instantiates a respect for human agency in a 
way that marks out the rule of law as having distinct value compared to forms of governance 
that move away from fidelity to general rules, towards the ‘rule of men’. 
Of course, an official’s motivations for complying with the rule of law may ignore 
this value for political effectiveness. But, as Fuller argues, these instrumental motivations 
have a reciprocal connection to the motivations of other participants, including legal subjects 
partly motivated by the cultivation of their own rational dominion within legal practice. The 
official is engaged in the giving and receiving of reasons within legal practice. If the reasons 
they offer cannot provide an intelligible justification to legal subjects, they may erode the co-
operative functioning of the practice and the mutual dispositions to act with fidelity to law, in 
support of law’s efficacy. 
 
G. LAW AS AN ANTI-SOCIAL PRACTICE 
Fuller appreciates that a theory of good legal order, and therefore legal pathology, follows 
upon understanding law as a co-operative social practice. The problem is that an appreciation 
of what constitutes a good or bad legal order does not simply follow from an understanding 
of the procedural morality of law. The pursuit of a political common good is the basis for 
mutual commitments to rule by law, and consequential commitments to principles of legality 
that serve this  common good in  considering how human persons should  be directed and 
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bound to act for the common ends embodied in law. By placing Fuller’s claims within this 
socio-political background, we can support his notion of reciprocity as internal (rather than 
contingent) to the social phenomenon of legal practice, and reinforce his argument that Hart 
cannot distinguish law in its focal sense from legal pathology. 
What constitutes an anti-social practice? MacIntyre’s distinction between internal and 
external goods allows us to conceptualise the non-focal instance of law as an objectification 
and  instrumentalisation  of  legal  practice.  The  co-operative  activity  of  legal  subjects  is 
objectified by the de-personalising treatment of legal practice as a mere tool. This reflects a 
failure to recognise the justificatory basis for action within legal practice by reference to the 
need to sustain a co-operative mode of political governance to pursue a political common 
good.81 It also indicates a failure to appreciate what Fuller calls the human dignity of legal 
subjects as responsible human agents and participants in legal practice. The practice is 
instrumentalised by its use for extrinsic ends, only contingently related to its co -operative 
nature. The external good of power becomes particularly relevant for an authority that seeks 
to use law for extraneous purposes which are divorced from any justification to citizens.82 
In  wicked  regimes,  there  will  be  various  laws  that  are  contrary  to  widespread 
understandings of the common good shared by legal subjects, and that violate principles of 
justice that are fundamental for sustaining the co -operative relations of legal practice. 83 The 
obedience and fidelity of legal subjects to such unjust laws can only be mai ntained  for 
reasons extraneous to the internal goods of law and therefore contingently connected to its 
co-operative activity. It may be, for example, that the preference of tyranny to anarchy or the 
threat of force can maintain the normative force of law as a reason for action for citizens. But 
these reasons are only a contingent justification for continued fidelity to that law. In these 
circumstances,  we  may  still  say  that  there  is  governance  by  law  if  that  governance  is 
constrained, to some degree, by Fuller’s principles of legality.84 However, that governance 
will be parasitic on a justificatory relationship to legal subjects which is only maintained by 
reasons for obedience that are generally incidental to the pursuit of a political common good. 
Thus, Aquinas describes the citizen’s participation in an unjust law as participation in the 
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achievement  of  a  good  relative  to  the  particular  authority. 85 Legal  practice  essentially 
becomes anti-social by the appropriation of its co-operative activity for purposes that do not 
aim to be shared reasons. 
However, a vestige of the procedural morality of law may remain. In the non -focal 
instance, the rule of law cannot promote a more expansive freedom as dominion for all 
citizens. In general, citizens will be less able t o understand the potential grounding reasons 
for the law as aiming at the common good. As a result, many will be excluded from the 
benefits of that aspect of freedom as dominion that can follow from being able to apprehend 
and act on the communal ends of the law as constituents of their overall good. Nevertheless, 
as Simmonds recognises, ‘[t]o be governed by law is to enjoy a degree of independence from 
the will of others’86 even within an anti-social legal practice. Since laws must be generally 
prospective with a degree of continuity, there is a degree of independence from the will of the 
lawmaker. This incorporates a domain of conduct subject to one’s own rational dominion 
because ‘in consisting of followable rules, the law must recognize certain areas of optional 
(non-obligatory) conduct, however narrowly circumscribed those areas may be’.87 
The freedom enjoyed within this instrumentalised legal practice is only a vestige of 
the broader freedom as dominion. For those legal subjects unable to apprehend and act on the 
communal ends of the law as constituents of their own good, any rational dominion will be 
experienced as mutually exclusive to the domain of obligatory conduct constrained by law’s 
substantive content. Essentially, the anti-social legal practice and practical rationality of those 
legal subjects will be at cross-purposes. In these circumstances, the binding authority of law 
takes on particular significance as an external constraint on individual conduct because the 
ends  are  no  longer  rationally  shared  by  the  participants  as  bona  fide  communal  ends. 
Nevertheless, to the extent there is still governance by law, the degree of respect for the eight 
precepts of legality which govern its promulgation and prospective operation provides some 
degree of independence. 
Raz denies that this establishes any necessary connection between the rule of law and 
human freedom. The law, he argues, can be an instrument to enact slavery, which is the very 
antithesis of such freedom.88 This can be challenged on two independent  grounds. The first 
ground is that there remains a degree of freedom as independence, as small as it may be, to 
the extent the eight desiderata are complied with in enacting a law creating slavery, and to the 
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extent the terms of that slavery are defined by law. The second is that a law creating slavery 
breaks the particular jural relation of rule by law between lawgiver and slave. The slave no 
longer stands in a relation of rule by law, but one of rule by will, to the extent they have no 
legal rights. The quality of the particular jural relation can be a matter of degree – just as the 
instantation of the rule of law through the eight desiderata can be a matter of degree. And, in 
the same way, the rule of law may still be instantiated to some degree in the rest of the 
community.  The  law  enacting  slavery  may  be  recognised  and  followed  as  law  by  the 
community of citizens who retain a jural relation with the lawgiver.89 
This  line  of  argument  provides  a  critical  rebuttal  to  Hart  in  the  spirit  of  Fuller’s 
jurisprudence. Even where law is used for unjust ends, it retains a connection to a specific 
moral value, reinforced by the co-operative justificatory basis for legal practice evident in its 
tradition  and  institutional  form.  The  reply  that  a  moral  value,  such  as  freedom  as 
independence, does not necessarily bear upon the reasoning of officials for accepting and 
applying  rules  as  law,  misses  the  mark.  The  moral  value  of  freedom  as  independence 
continues  to  inform  the  historically  constituted  standards  of  the  practice,  including  its 
secondary rules, despite their instrumentalisation. It is instantiated as an internal justificatory 
standard within the practice, and embedded in its tradition and institutional form, whilst not 
necessarily being part of the particular reasons of an official. 
We might agree with Hart. It is unfortunate such a moral value is consistent with great 
iniquity. Our life narrative and social practices  can be caught interdependently within an 
unjust social order. Hart, however, renders this human condition superficial by abstracting it 
from its social embeddedness, along with a moral life that only makes sense within it.90 This 
social interdependence is underpinned within legal practice by the internal goods that provide 
a common motivational basis to sustain that practice by mutual fidelity to law, and therefore 
the justificatory standards for the actions of legal officials. In contrast, legal positivism 
isolates the practical reasons of lawmakers or officials from the justificatory standards that 
follow from the co-operative nature of legal practice. Recall Hart’s poisoning analogy. Hart 
interprets Fuller as failing to distinguish between purposive activity and morality. But the key 
distinction Hart abstracts from is that law is a co-operative activity. Its purposive functioning 
is conditioned by moral standards; just as the art of making poison would be conditioned by 
moral standards within the broader co-operative activity of pharmaceutical production for the 
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sake of medical practice. The moral importance of these standards is are intensified by the act 
that legal subjects cannot typically choose to extricate their life narrative from political and 
legal practice. 
As  argued  in  Part  C,  there  are  some  ends  that  are  part  of  the  overall  good  of 
individuals  which  can  only  be  achieved  through  political  practice  aiming  to  achieve  a 
political common good. This provides the reason for political governance as a legitimate co-
operative  enterprise,  as  opposed  to  an  instrument  for  social  control  which  only  rests  on 
incidental reasons for obedience. In this justificatory context, the rule of law is a constitutive 
form  of  governance  by  which  the  development  and  exercise  of  human  capacities,  as 
independent practical reasoners, can be respected as much as possible, even in circumstances 
of disagreement about the common good. It thereby sustains and extends the mutual fidelity 
of citizens to that form of political governance. 
By  applying  MacIntyre’s  concept  of  a  ‘social  practice’  to  law,  we  can  identify  a 
fundamental mistake in legal positivism. It conflates the pursuit of goods internal to legal 
practice with the instrumentalisation of legal practice for external goods. Legal positivists do 
this  by  abstracting  from  the  co-operative  nature  of  legal  practice  as  a  social  practice. 
Nevertheless,  even  though  this  instrumentalisation  of  legal  practice  may  undermine  the 
intentional link between the rule of law and common good, and corrupt the internal good of 
rational dominion; there remains a vestige of law’s adeptness for the common good that flows 
from its nature as addressing the practical intellect of legal subjects. This is the degree of 
freedom as independence, however thin, that governance by law secures for citizens to pursue 
their own life narrative despite the purposes of an unjust regime. 
 
H. CONCLUSION 
This  paper has  argued that  the reliance of  Fuller’s  procedural  legal  morality on political 
reciprocity implicates an important dependency on the pursuit of a political common good 
which  can  explain  that  reciprocity  as  a  necessary  feature  of  legal  practice.  Without  an 
adequate treatment  of  why political  practice should  be understood as an intrinsically  co-
operative activity, Fuller’s thought remains open to positivist rejoinders that would treat this 
reciprocity as an incidental feature of law, and not a necessary justificatory basis to sustain 
the actions of legal officials. Legal positivists can thereby claim that the rule of law has no 
necessary  connection  to  morals  because  law  can  be  used  for  good  or  evil  purposes.  To 
establish Fuller’s claims about the necessary moral value of the rule of law, I have argued 
that we need to understand law as a ‘social practice’ in the sense defined by MacIntyre. This UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
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provides  the  necessary  socio-political  context  to  explain  why  and  how  legal  practice  is 
conditioned by political reciprocity. By applying MacIntyre’s distinction between internal 
and external goods, legal positivism can be understood as confusing law as a co-operative 
social practice with the instrumentalisation of legal practice by officials. 
Ultimately, the issues in dispute turn on how we understand the conditions of human 
sociality that provide the intelligible context to the human activity of law. This is where 
MacIntyre’s  conception  of  a  social  practice  and  a  political  common  good  is  helpful  for 
Fuller’s case. But, if we take MacIntyre’s critique of modernity seriously, an instrumentalist 
understanding  of  law  in  modern  jurisprudence  might  reflect  a  deeper  pathology  in  our 
cultural understanding and engagement in existing practices within liberal modernity. We 
might well ask: to what extent can the modern state provide for an institutional form to legal 
practice that can support law in the focal instance? This question, which I raise for future 
reflection, does not query the conceptualisation of law as a social practice articulated in this 
paper.  It  queries  the  extent  to  which  modern  legal  practice,  within  contemporary  liberal 
societies, is either well ordered to its internal goods or systematically instrumentalised. It is a 
critical  question  for  understanding  how  MacIntyre’s  political  philosophy  would  relate  to 
existing legal practice, and the extent our political order provides for a broader freedom as 
dominion  or  a  narrow  freedom  as  independence  through  the  rule  of  law. 91  The 
instrumentalisation of the rule of law noted in legal theory could point to a deeper pathology 
in our socio-political context.92 
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